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Abstract 
The current budgetary crises can be seen as a test case for New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms that have been adopted worldwide during the last two decades. One of 
these tools, performance based budgeting (PBB), is the subject of this paper. Although 
the roots of Performance Based Budgeting can be traced back as far as the early 
20thcentury, PBB gained worldwide popularity in the 1990s and early 2000s as part of 
the NPM agenda. NPM introduced a set of recipes that were meant to transform the 
public sector towards more result orientation and efficiency. It is not clear yet what the 
post NPM era will look like exactly, but it looks like NPM’s heyday is well behind us. In 
the meantime, many traces of these reforms still dominate today’s public sector 
landscape.  
 
It can easily be argued that PBB has become and remained so popular more because of 
the promises that it holds than the results that can empirically be attributed to its 
introduction. Regarding PBB, Allen Schick once noted that: governments that don’t 
manage for results will not budget for results *Schick 2003+. Expanding on Schick’s 
observation, the very type of result orientation that PBB was intended to achieve may 
turn out to be its main unarticulated premise. In other words, did PBB indeed modify 
public organizations and their steering relationships? Or did it merely codify existing 
behavior in those cases that report success?  
 
This paper presents a theoretical framework and method to assess this question. Lending 
from neo-institutional, more precisely principal-agent theory, alternative explanations 
for the use of performance information will be tested in international cases that share 
successful PBB implementation. The incentives PBB creates strongly rely on the logic of 
consequence. The alternative explanations sought follow the logic of appropriateness by 
focusing on the concepts such as of path dependency, cultural appropriateness and 
cognitive frames. 
                                                 
1
 Maarten de Jong is affiliated with the Department of Public Administration of the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
 2 
Introduction 
It was Winston Churchill who allegedly said that success is the ability to go from failure to failure 
without losing enthusiasm. Measured by this standard the performance budgeting movement 
should be credited with quite a successful history. Attempts of governments worldwide to 
structurally integrate their budgets with performance planning and reporting, was expected to 
lead to more efficient allocation of public spending and provide tools to cut wasteful ineffective 
spending. However, so far, there has not been much evidence supporting major reallocation of 
spending as a result of performance based budgeting (PBB) reforms. At the same time 
occasional success stories have kept the promise of more objective, performance informed 
decisions by public sector managers and politicians on government’s agendas worldwide for at 
least the last two decades. 
  
The current economic downturn and the austere fiscal outlook it brings for governments around 
the world can be viewed as a test for NPM reforms in general and PBB in particular. What has 
been the usefulness of PBB reforms in bringing about what they were originally intended for: 
making government more efficient and cut wasteful spending? Can PBB fulfill a future role in 
building sound public finances or will it turn out to have been a temporary distraction, 
rendered unfashionable due to the new harsh financial outlook? This study looks more 
deeply into the effects of this particular NPM tool.  
 
1. What is PBB? 
Although the roots of Performance Based Budgeting can be traced back as far as the early 
20thcentury, PBB gained worldwide popularity in the 1990s and early 2000s as part of the New 
Public Management agenda. NPM introduced a set of recipes that were meant to transform the 
public sector towards more result orientation and efficiencyi. Several forms of PBB have been 
defined by different authorsii but key elements of PBB reforms include budgeting on the basis of 
output and outcome targets and financing executive agencies on the basis of output targets. 
Using a PBB system is commonly associated with the following activities: 
 setting measurable objectives and performance indicators for government programs 
 presenting expected results alongside spending levels in budget documents 
 measurement and reporting of results during or afterwards program execution  
 evaluation of results and use of this information for strategic planning and budgeting 
It is not clear yet what the post NPM era will look like exactly, but it looks like NPM’s heyday is 
well behind us. In the meantime, many traces of these reforms still dominate today’s public 
sector landscape. One of them, performance based budgeting (PBB) is the subject of this paper.  
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2. Results of PBB 
Although the attempts to link government spending to public sector performance seem to have 
increased transparency of budget documents to a certain extent (Curristine 2005 in Redburn 
2008: 216/17, GAO 2004: 11, Van Nispen & Posseth 2006: 57), there is disappointment as well. 
Experience in the federal US, the Netherlands and other OECD countries demonstrate that the 
effects of PBB on budgetary allocation by parliaments have been nearly absent (Frisco and 
Stalebrink 2008, Wanna et. Al. 2010, Curristine 2007  respectively).   
 
Less visible and harder to substantiate are claims that PBB enabled better control of 
government agencies and installed result oriented behavioral incentives within government 
agencies. On the effects of performance based monitoring of government agencies, the 
evidence is mostly anecdotal and inconclusive.  This study focuses on this particular on the use 
of PBB within government agencies and in the steering relation with their principal (s). 
Although one can have serious doubts about the attempts to ‘rationalize’ budgetary decision 
making using PBB, some claim that performance management reforms can change managerial 
behavior and performance information does get used, be it at a different place and time. 
According to several authors, benefits of PBB reforms mostly occur at the agency levels and in 
the budget preparation and budget execution phase and not in the budget approval and 
evaluation phases (Joyce 2003, Moynihan 2008, Posner 2009).  
 
With regard to using PBB for agency management, the assumption that the NPM-ideal type 
agency modeliii enhances the performance of public sector organizations is largely untested 
(Verhoest and Laegreid in Verhoest et al 2011). However there is evidence that increased 
autonomy and result control can lead to more innovative behavior or an increased use of result 
oriented management tools within agencies. Both can be considered as preconditions for better 
performance. (Verhoest et al 2010 in Verhoest at al 2011).  
 
It can be concluded that the budgetary impact of PBB is not to be expected from political 
decision making on the level of allocative efficiency between government programs. Instead, 
PBB’s budgetary impact lies mainly in its ability to improve technical efficiency within 
government programs. Or put differently: 
 
Regarding PBB’s effects on a more effective allocation of resources in the public sector, the 
most credible remaining claims for PBB success lie in its possible indirect, less visible effects, 
most notably in agency management.  
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3. Research question 
When talking about the conditions for success of performance budgeting, Allen Schick noted in  
(Schick 2003): 
How much influence performance budgeting has depends on who else is at the table-that is, the 
orientation of the politicians and managers who make budget….Performance budgeting can 
thrive only when it is embedded in managerial arrangements that make results paramount. This 
writer is not aware of a single sustained implementation of performance budgeting that was not 
accompanied and reinforced by transformations in public management that enhanced 
performance. Governments that do not manage for results do not budget for results, even if they 
install the outward trappings in performance budgeting….. 
Rather than being the locomotive that drives government to change, performance budgeting is 
the caboose that confirms the transformations that have been made. To achieve true reform, it 
may be better to follow the parade than to lead it. 
 
Expanding on Schick’s observation that governments that don’t manage for results will not 
budget for results, the very type of result orientation that PBB was intended to achieve may turn 
out to be its main unarticulated premise. In other words, did PBB indeed modify public 
organizations and their steering relationships? So, in the cases where PBB success is reported, 
did these tools indeed modify behavior or did they merely codify existing behavior? In other 
words:  does successful PBB implementation create favorable circumstances for result 
orientation? Or can successful PBB implementation only result from favorable circumstances for 
result orientation? Applied to the steering relationship between a government principal and a 
Public Sector Bureau (PSB) acting as agent, the central question to this research is therefore: 
 
Can cases of successful PBB implementation in a PSB-Principal relationship generally be 
explained by favourable conditions for result orientation that are independent from the 
adoption of the PBB system? 
 
This paper presents a theoretical framework and method to assess this question. Lending from 
neo-institutional, more precisely principal-agent theory, alternative explanations for the use of 
performance information will be tested in international cases that share a record of successful 
PBB implementation.  
 
As NPM in general and PBB in particular have been presented as solutions to challenges 
characteristic to public sector organizations (lack of incentives to perform, no competition, 
bilateral monopolies) it is all but impossible to separate the effects of these reforms from their 
institutional context. In fact it can be argues that PBB is deeply rooted in the neo-institutional 
tradition.   
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4. (Neo) Institutional theory 
Because the institutional context is a likely factor that could explain why PBB does or does not 
result in the intended effects highlighted here, I will turn to institutionalism and some of its 
schools of thought. Attention to the influence of institutions on political and social outcomes is 
known as institutionalism and can be viewed as a wider trend of applying social theory to 
economic rationalist assumptions.  
 
Institutionalism can be traced back to the 18th and 19th century as some of its key notions were 
already discussed by classical philosophers in those days. For example, Rousseau stressed the 
difference between the public interest and the aggregation of individual interests and De 
Tocqueville saw in local political institutions an antidote for despotism (Immergut, 1998).   
 
Expanding the definition of an institution beyond the formal arrangement or organization, an 
institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining 
appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations. That way, institutions 
socialize individuals by legitimizing behavior associated with roles to be enacted or sanctioning 
behavior that differs from what is considered appropriate. Practices and rules are also 
embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation (March&Olsen 1998). A more 
simple definition of institutions was given by William Riker: rules about behavior, especially 
about making decisions (Riker 1982:4 in Ostrom 1986). Institutionalization refers to the 
emergence of institutions and individual behaviors with them (Olsen 1997). An institutional 
approach is one that emphasizes the role of institutions and institutionalization in the 
understanding of human actions within an organization, social order or society (March&Olsen 
1998). 
 
At the heart of the institutional debate is a central notion on the drivers of human behavior: Are 
actions driven by expectations of consequences, also referred to as the ‘logic of consequence’ or 
are actions driven by rules that come with a particular role or identity, also referred to as ‘logic 
of appropriateness’ ? The answer to this question affects one’s view on how political life is 
organized to a considerable extent.  
 
From a ‘logic of consequence’ point of view, organization of political life is a result of actions by 
rational self-maximizing actors with conflicting interests and varying resources that negotiate a 
set of contracts. These actions are consequence based and are of an instrumental nature. 
Although theories of bounded rationality have modified this perspective somewhat, the central 
notion that behavior is primarily driven by expected consequences that will maximize one’s 
benefits is left untouched (March&Olsen 1998). 
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From a ‘logic of appropriateness’ point of view, political life is a result of rules that are socially 
constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. These actions are rule based and reflect 
a perceived identity of the actor. The central notion here is that people are role players and rule 
followers that will act out of duty or social pressure (March&Olsen 1998).  Behavior is therefore 
primarily driven by what people feel is appropriate behavior.  
 
Neo institutionalism is commonly viewed as a response to the political behavior movement in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The critique of neo institutionalism on behavioralism centers around three 
main points (Immergut 1998). 
 Behavior does not reveal preferences 
 Preferences cannot be added up to become political preferences 
 Institutions are biased and collective decisions are normative 
 
Three branches of neo-institutionalism are generally recognized. They all developed their own 
reaction to behavioralism by blending institutional approaches with existing political theories. 
These three schools are: Historical Institutionalism, Sociological (or Organizational Theory) 
institutionalism and Rational Choice institutionalism. The first two are shared jointly under 
Historical Institutionalism by some (Bell 2002). Historical institutionalism is the broadest variant 
of the three incorporating both a calculus and a cultural approach and is sometimes referred to 
as eclectic (Immergut 1998). According to the calculus approach, institutions are shaped 
according to a sort of ‘Nash equilibrium’ maximizing each individual’s benefit from strategic 
calculation. According to the cultural approach, people behave strategically albeit bounded by 
their worldview, which includes moral and cognitive templates provided by institutions. 
Institutions are therefore resistant to reform because they reflect the very choices about reform 
that the individual is likely to make. (Hall & Taylor 1996). 
 
Looking at some similarities and differences between these three branches of neo 
institutionalism, it can be said that both rational choice and sociological approaches suggest that 
people are purposive, goal oriented and rational. Sociological institutionalism stresses that 
rational action itself is socially constructed. Rational Choice institutionalism explains the 
existence of institutions by the assumption that they provide efficiency (a logic of consequence) 
while sociological institutionalism claims institutions are there because they provide legitimacy 
(a logic of appropriateness). The central notion from both historical and sociological 
institutionalism is that new institutions arise amidst existing ones. Sociological institutionalism 
claims that new institutions borrow templates from existing ones while historical 
institutionalism stresses that a new institution is faced with set of existing power relations and 
path dependencies.  
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5. PBB in the institutionalist tradition 
When placing NPM and PBB is the institutionalist lineage it should be acknowledged that the  
Theory of Performance Based Budgeting is deeply rooted in the logic of consequence and thus 
fits the assumptions of Ration Choice Institutionalism. By integrating planned activities and 
expected outcomes and budgets, the existence of a predictable causality in policy theories is 
explicitly assumed. The expectation that this information will be used in the oversight of 
government by parliament and the management of government agencies assumes that 
politicians and managers are to a great extent driven by the expected consequences of policy 
choices. Furthermore, the need to produce and report performance information as a necessary 
precondition for managing government institutions and their relationships is an essential part of 
theory building on the part of Rational Choice theorists. A well known application of Rational 
Choice theory in economics has been in Agency Theory. 
 
If both principal and agent try to maximize their utility, the agent is expected not to fully serve 
the principal’s interests as it will have competing preferences. According to Agency Theory, the 
agent is the expert in performing the tasks that the principal orders it to do. The principal 
operates at a certain distance from the vital processes and relations, necessary for performing 
these tasks. As a result the agent has an information advantage that it may use to maximize its 
own utility at the expense of that of the principal. This so called information asymmetry is the 
central problem in Agency Theory (Ter Bogt 1997). According to Agency theory the interests of 
the principal compete with and are being sacrificed for conflicting interests of the agent. This 
results in efficiency losses due to rent-seeking behavior by the against such as adverse 
selectioniv and moral hazardv.  
 
In order to align the agent’s interests with his own, the principal can use incentives and 
monitoring. This is exactly what PBB intends to achieve in the principal-PSB relationship. 
Implementation of performance based contracts in the public sector was usually introduced as 
an element of broader performance budgeting (PBB) and matched the adoption of performance 
standards for public services. By suggesting these kinds of solutions, applied rational choice 
The rationale of NPM and PBB is primarily based on the assumption that behavior of 
people and organizations follows logic of consequence . 
If result oriented behavior displayed by public agencies in PBB success stories, can found to 
be clearly in alignment with a perceived logic of appropriateness, this would cast additional 
doubts over PBB’s  contributions 
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institutionalism has had significant impact on the major reforms in public sector management in 
recent years (Bell 2002).   
 
By translating political agenda’s into performance based policy plans and contracts with 
agencies, PBB has become a tool to align the interests of political principals with those of public 
sector bureaus. An extensive performance monitoring structure was been put in place to bridge 
the information gap of principals. Sometimes direct financial incentives are being tied to 
meeting performance targets in attempt to influence behavior of the public sector bureau and 
its members. This way the expected behavioral effects from information asymmetry and their 
negative effect on the effective allocation of resources in the public sector are expected to be 
offset or prevented with the help of PBB. The linking of theoretical concepts used for this 
research is schematically displayed in Figure 1. Without going into all the theoretical concepts 
separately in detail here, it is meant to illustrate that PBB’s assumptions towards performance 
information use are associated with one neo-institutionalist school of thought in particular, 
namely rational choice institutionalism whereas the other two schools might offer alternative 
explanations for organizational behavior perceived as a result of PBB reforms.  
 
 
Figure 1  Linking of Theoretical concepts                                                                                        
 
 
6. Relevance of neo institutionalism for answering the research question  
Turning back to the research question on the explanation of reported PBB success, alternative 
explanations can be sought following the logic of appropriateness. These may offer a different 
explanation of behavior perceived as resulting from successful PBB implementation. By focusing 
on selected neo institutional concepts, favorable conditions may be identified that explain result 
oriented behavior linked to the specific institutional context and independent from the 
formalized incentives a PBB system offers. If case-studies provide a credible alternative 
explanation for reported PBB success, the potential of PBB to change agency behavior ought to 
be seriously questioned. However, if the cases do not result in a convincing alternative 
explanation, at least one claim to PBB success still stands. 
 
Having gained more theoretical background on the theoretical background and the variety of 
views associated with institutionalism, Schick’s observation that ‘governments that don’t 
manage for results will not budget for results’ deserves a second look (see paragraph 3). If it is 
true what Schick says, introduction of PBB by a Public Sector Bureau or its principal(s) would 
only deliver results if a number of other, independent factors, are present. As a consequence, 
PBB successes that are reported from a PBS or their principal(s) would, according to Schick, only 
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have been made possible because ‘managerial arrangements that make results paramount’  
were already in place or because PBB was accompanied by other ‘transformations in public 
management that enhanced performance’  (Schick 2003). The fact that internal result-
orientation of a PSB has itself, also been reported as a consequence of adopting a PBB system, 
points at a possible fallacy of circular justification regarding successful PBB adoption:  Does 
successful PBB implementation create favorable circumstances for result orientation? Or can 
successful PBB implementation only result from favorable circumstances for result orientation?  
 
Finding an answer to this question can only proceed after the favorable circumstances for result 
orientation are identified and defined. The answer to the question what managerial 
arrangements and transformations are deemed necessary for PBB to work remains undisclosed 
by Schick.  He does refer however to the politicians and managers as actors in the budgetary 
process relevant factors to the results of PBB. Applied to the research question this suggests 
that the managers within a PSB and those of their principals are of particular relevance for 
reported cases of successful PBB.   
 
 
Later on these factors will be utilized in an attempt to build a model suitable for testing in case-
studies.  In search of further specification of relevant explanatory factors, some of the criticism 
towards the assumptions of PBB reforms is  particularly worthwhile examining.   
 
7. Behavioral and Institutional critique to PBB  
The notion that performance information will used for decision making by public sector 
management that contributes to efficiency rests on the assumptions that the information gets 
used in an organizational learning process leading to more technical efficiency in executing 
government programs. Just how this is supposed to happen has remained largely unspecified in 
PBB theory building. 
 
The likeliness that performance information is used for technical (intra-program) efficiency can 
be criticized when looking at alternative theories on the way policies are reshaped, conducted 
and adjusted.  To agency managers, who are usually busy battling unexpected crises that can 
only be cured by resources rather than strategic thinking, performance management is often 
little more than a distraction (Moynihan 2008). Faced with the complexity of real world policy 
dilemmas, bureaucrats understandably opt for other ways to select policy alternatives than 
comprehensive systematic analysis. It can even be argued that their scientifically ‘flawed’ 
Managerial focus and organization development may be crucial or even indispensible for 
successful  PBB reforms in government organizations. 
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methods are often superior to any futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness (Lindblom 
1959).  
 
The absence of intrinsic learning behavior within an organization can be explained by many 
factors. Among these are: the occurrence of specific learning disabilities that every organization 
is prone to. Peter Senge summed up seven general learning disabilities in his popular 1990 work 
on learning organizations (Senge 1990): 
1.  I am my own position is when people focus only on their position within the organization and 
have little sense of responsibility for the results produced when all positions interact. For 
example: ‘I work as a budget advisor for the health department’ instead of ‘We try to control 
public health care costs’  
2. The enemy is out there syndrome is when we blame some external reason without focus only 
on our position; we do not see how our own actions extend beyond the boundary of that 
position. For example ‘politics is just an irrational business’ without adding ‘which I did not 
anticipate when making a policy proposal’  
3. The illusion of taking charge is that proactiveness is really reactiveness in disguise. Instead of 
facing up to difficult issues and solving them before they grow into crises, people rely on more of 
the trusted ineffective recipes. Illustrative is the attitude ’What we need is a bigger hammer’. 
Real proactiveness includes insight in your own contribution to the problem. This is a recognized 
phenomenon in public policy (see law of accumulation of policy CH…). 
4. The fixation on events leads to “event” explanations that are true for now but distract us from 
seeing the longer-term patterns of change behind the events and understanding the causes of 
the patterns to events. Practitioners will easily recognize the dominant pattern of political 
leaders quickly responding to incidents by promising additional regulation and inspection before 
any deeper, long term analysis has taken place. 
5. The parable of the boiled frog is in relation to the maladaptation of organizations to 
recognize gradually building threats to survival; just as the frog placed in a pot of water brought 
to boiling temperature will not attempt to jump out of the pot but adjusts to the temperature 
and slowly dies. The lesson of this story is that we are better equipped to respond to immenent 
threats than to incremental ones.  
6. The delusion of learning from experience is when our actions have consequences in the 
distant future or are part of the larger operating system, which makes it impossible to learn from 
direct experience. The most powerful learning impulses stem from direct experience (e.g. 
tasting). An important notion in this respect is one’s learning horizon. The learning horizon is the 
limitation in time and space for judging one’s effectiveness. In time this is usually one or two 
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years. Beyond that horizon lessons will have less of an impact. The learning paradox refers to the 
conclusion that our most important decisions are beyond our learning horizon. 
7. The myth of the management team because management teams tend to spend their time 
fighting for turf, avoiding anything that will make them look bad personally, and pretending that 
everyone is behind the team’s collective strategy. Solving urgent problems is usually regarded 
higher than asking difficult questions on current policies. This poses a problem for organizational 
learning from performance flaws. 
 
In addition Senge mentions a low degree of participative or reflective opennessvi and the 
absence of individual rewards or penalties (Senge 1990) as notable organizational learning 
disabilities. The latter point has also been made by public choice theory with regard to large 
group behavior (Olson 1965). In government organizations a focus on compliance instead of 
performance (Schick 2003, Osborne & Plastrik 1997) can provide an additional obstacle to result 
orientation and therefore learning behavior. 
 
Given the obstacles to learning behavior in public organizations, it may appear unrealistic to 
expect an abundant use of performance for program learning or enlightment. Or, as Allen Schick 
noted: successful organizations learn and adapt, changing what they do and how they work in 
response to both internal and external signals. But performance is only one of the drivers of 
change, and not always the most important one (Schick 2003). This may indicate that traditional 
PBB theory is flawed to a degree or at least does not take into account knowledge about 
learning behavior in public sector organizations, a point made earlier by Donald Moynihan 
(Moynihan 2005). 
 
The problems encountered with the use of performance information by public sector 
organizations are summed up well by Moynihan in his Interactive Dialogue Model of 
Performance Information Use (Moynihan 2008). This model, or rather set of assumptions, 
challenges PBB theory at the micro level. In fact, what Moynihan expresses in his model is an 
institutionalist critique on PBB. The model’s central assumptions are: 
1. P.I. is not comprehensive,  
2. P.I. is ambiguous  
3. P.I. is subjective 
4. Production of P.I. does not guarantee use 
5. Institutional affiliation and individual beliefs will affect selection, perception, and 
presentation of P.I. 
6. The context of dialogue will affect the ability to use P.I. to develop solutions 
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The first three assumptions reflect the idea that performance information usually consists of 
one or more indicators of actual performance and as such never reflect a whole universal truth 
about performance, the existence of which can obviously be debated in the first place. They 
partly mirror the ‘misassumptions’ of PBB as noted by Beryl Radin (Radin 2006) as she 
confronted six assumptionsvii that constituted what she called the ‘unreal and naïve approach’ of 
the performance movement, with reality (Radin 2006). The importance of these notions lies in 
the fact that once you accept that P.I. is not comprehensive, ambiguous and subjective, the 
rational basis for a performance informed dialogue between actors in the budget process, vital 
to PBB theory, is largely gone. What remains is a dialogue in which behavioral and institutional 
factors play a large role and are even likely to dominate.  
 
The fourth assumption deals with problems regarding the use of performance data. Moynihan 
also notes that when PI is used, it is not always used in the way PBB reforms envisioned it to be 
used (Moynihan 2008). So, not only does production of PI not guarantee use, use itself may or 
may not contribute to efficiency depending on the purpose of use. 
 
Taking the fifth assumption a bit further, the consequences of institutional affiliation and 
individual beliefs may well exceed the consequences of selection, perception and presentation 
of P.I. It is possible to assume that selection, perception and presentation of P.I., even if this is 
geared towards enlightment or program learning, still does not result in the efficiency gains that 
PBB theory expects. There may be so because other organizational factors may form 
impediments to actually harvesting on the performance informed lessons.  
 
The context of dialogue presented in the sixth assumption may be heavily influenced by 
institutional affiliation and individual beliefs as well. The way the organizational dialogue is 
conducted between those who measure and interpret performance and those who account for 
performance can prove to be an obstacle to applying the lessons to be learned.  A dialogue that 
involves only a few parties that maintain a close relationship offers the best guarantee for 
efficient exchange of information because much information can remain implicit (Moynihan 
2008:19, Wierdsma 1999). A drawback from such a dialogue is that only acceptable and 
predictable positions are taken and no truly new insights emerge. PBB can be viewed as an 
attempt to break open the policy dialogue to be able to involve other parties (e.g. the financial 
department, parliament). This is attempted by making many implicit assumptions explicit (e.g. 
policy objectives goals, expected outcomes, criteria for success). If a perceived outsider is 
forcing his insights into a policy dialogue, defensive routines are likely to occur on the part of the 
public sector bureau. This can result in a ritual dialogue in which referral is made primarily to a 
formal positions and documents rather than actual policy content (Argyris and Schön 1996, Van 
der Knaap 1997).  
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8. What does PBB success look like precisely?  
In the previous paragraphs focused on organizational and behavioral obstacles that may prevent 
PBB from working in PSB and its principal.  Nonetheless, some anecdotal evidence for PBB 
success in terms of technical efficiency does exist. The question remains just how does the 
measurement and reporting of performance and the analysis of these data contribute to 
efficiency in these cases.   
 
The actual use of performance information (P.I.) by a public sector bureau and its principal(s) to 
inform management decisions is a vital link to PBB theory and has been studied by several 
authors.  Although use of performance information by government agencies has been reported 
for a myriad of purposes, not all of them count as successful adoption of the underlying PBB 
goal of more effective allocation of resources. Use of performance information can be classified 
in five broad categories of use (De Lancer Julnes  in Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008) 
 
 Reassurance: Government shows it is doing what it is supposed to do with taxpayer’s 
money (e.g.  reporting performance information about cleans streets or safe 
neighborhoods) 
 Compliance: Agencies demonstrate that they comply with performance measurement 
regulations (e.g. schools report test results to receive funding) 
 Program learning: Learning from results may lead to program changes or maybe just to 
a better informed dialogue. 
 Enlightment: Externally, enlightment can lead to mobilization and put an issue on the 
political agenda (e.g. awareness of waiting lines in public service). 
Internally, enlightment can lead to more informed decisions and better educated 
stakeholders. This can generate new insights and challenge previously held perceptions. 
 Legitimization: Performance information can be used ro rationalize, justify or validate 
current, past and future course of actions and decisions (e.g. justifying budget requests, 
or defending oneself towards critics) 
 
Looking at these uses of performance, the use of performance information for the purposes of 
program learning and enlightment seem to be relevant for both operational efficiency and 
internal result orientation thus indirectly contributing to the aim of more effective allocation of 
resources in the public sector. Reassurance seems to primarily address the transparency aim of 
In PBB literature, the relevance of the institutional context has long been understudied. 
Especially the conditions for learning behaviour should receive more attention.   
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PBB while using performance information to legitimize existing positions like budget claims 
merely adds to existing dynamics. Finally compliance with PBB regulations, can, for the purpose 
of this study, not be counted as PBB success either. Doing so would indeed regard PBB reform as 
a self legitimizing exercise. A number of reported activities by government agencies involving 
the use of performance information can serve the purpose of program learning or enlightment 
are illustrated in Table 1 (reported activities are based on Joyce 2003 in Breul & Moravitz, Wang 
2000 as quoted in Redburn 2008 and GAO 2004). 
 
Table 1  The utilization of performance information for technical efficiency 
 
So the role of performance information, when expected to contribute to efficiency and result 
orientation, would foremost be to contribute to program learning or enlightment. Drawing a 
parallel with common literature on learning organizations, the difference between using 
performance information for program learning and for enlightment resembles the difference 
made between single loop and double loop learning respectively. According to the classic work 
of Argyris and Schön with regard to learning organizations, single loop learning involves the 
detection and correction of errors given a particular goal or plan. Double loop learning involves 
questioning the underlying norms, values and objectives (Argyris & Schön, 1996). When studying 
the lessons the NL government learned from policy evaluation, Peter van der Knaap applied a 
similar difference between corrective learning and fundamental learning, the latter adding to 
the existing underlying policy assumptions (Van der Knaap, 1997). 
 
The kind of anecdotal evidence often presented usually fits these categories like these ones Paul 
Posner mentioned, amongst others,  in his testimony to the U.S. Senate Budget Committee on 
October 29th 2009 (Posner, 2009): 
 
• FDA’s office of generic drugs used performance targets and monitoring to reduce the time to 
review generic drug applications. As a result, the percent of applications reviewed within 180 
days went from 35 to 87 percent. In addition to tracking overall progress, performance data 
were used on a real time basis to monitor workload across units, enabling the agency to break 
through bottlenecks by shifting work to less burdened units.  
 
• The National Highway Traffic Safety Agency used performance data to show the increases in 
seat belt use flowing from the “Click it or Ticket” safety belt program in three states. 
Performance data documenting the effectiveness of this strategy prompted its adoption by most 
states in the country, leading to dramatic increases in safety belt usage throughout the nation.  
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Although the budgetary aspect may not be explicitly mentioned in these cases, it can be 
asserted that the use of performance information to increase a certain policy’s output or 
outcome against a similar level of funding benefits effective allocation of resources in the public 
sector as a whole. Moreover a useful definition of de facto PBB success in agency management 
would contain the following elements: 
 Performance information explicitly informs proposals prepared for the budgetary 
process;   
 These proposals contribute to program learning or even enlightment;  
 The proposals result in decisions that demonstrate more efficient service delivery or 
even policy shifts increasing effectiveness. This should be recorded in documents 
related to the budgeting cycle or the principal-agent relationship.  
 
 
 
9. Building a model to be tested 
The previous sections explained that agency theory highlights the possibility of information 
asymmetry helping the pursuit of agency interests at the expense of the principal’s effectiveness 
and efficiency. In the tradition of rational choice institutionalism, the tendency of dysfunctional 
behavior by the agent, also known as the principal agent dilemma, has to be offset by other 
incentives that fit the same logic of consequence. These are financial incentives to perform and 
monitoring of the agent’s performance by the principal. Implementation of a PBB system has 
been the weapon of choice by public sector budgeters worldwide to accomplish these tasks over 
the last couple of decades. If used successfully, PBB would help the agent use its resources to 
achieve the results requested by the principal in the most efficient manner. Result oriented 
allocation by the agent in this sense, contrasts with the expected tendency of a PSB to use 
resources for its own preferences. Looking more closely at PBB success in agency management, 
it was argued earlier on that only the use of performance information in decisions leading to 
program learning or enlightment counts as PBB success. When looking at public administration 
following the logic of appropriateness, an agency that operates in an effective and efficient 
manner according to a principal is seen as testimony of the success of PBB used for agency 
management.    
 
As shown earlier, the logic of appropriateness assumes that organizations and organization 
members are primarily rule followers driven by social pressure instead of anticipating 
In cases of successful PBB implementation at the PSB level, the use of performance 
information by a PSB and its principal are expected to result resulting in program-learning 
or even enlightment, resulting in a more effective or efficient service delivery. 
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consequences in order to maximizing their own utility. This may offer an alternative explanation 
of a claim to success of PBB. Several neo institutional factors may explain why a certain PSB 
displays result oriented allocation and In fact bear reference to the absence of earning obstacles 
identified by Senge as well as Moynihan’ s insititutional critique of PBB. 
 
Sociological institutionalism challenges the distinction between rationality and culture. 
Institutional forms and procedures are largely adopted because they are culturally specific 
(referring to myths and ceremonies) and not necessarily because they were most efficientviii. 
Institutions are defined in terms of symbol systems, cognitive script and moral templates. This 
determines how situations are recognized and responded to (Hall & Taylor 1996).  
 
Cultural appropriateness: in a given public sector bureau, displaying result orientation behavior 
by conducting critical assessments or debating effectiveness may be supported or punished by 
the organization’s leadership and culture.  
 
Cognitive frames: The way (performance) information is selected, interpreted, presented and 
processed may be highly dependent upon shared cognitive frames that exist in a PSB. These 
frames may have originated from a shared organizational or professional or educational 
background. Implementation of the PBB idea of introducing accountability based on objective 
performance information is likely to be heavily influenced by shared cognitive frames.  
 
Historical institutionalism developed notions of how, in the competition for scarce resources, 
some interests were privileged and others demobilized. Historical institutionalists stress 
asymmetries of power, path dependency, unintended consequences and inefficiencies of 
existing institutions. History is divided in periods of continuity altered by ‘critical junctures’.  
Bearing in mind the ‘managerial arrangements and transformations’ referred to as essential for 
successful PBB reform by Schick , two notions in particular may bear relevance to the 
explanation of result oriented behavior by a PSB in  a principal agent relationship  
 
Asymmetries of power: Some groups or interests have disproportionate influence on decision 
making process. This formal or informal balance of power may be inherent to a certain 
institutional setting that characterizes a policy field or PSB.  
 
Path dependency: A critical junction may be identified that created a branching point that 
explains the current path of the PSB in many different respects including de facto PBB 
implementation and result orientated allocation.  
 
 17 
The unpredictable volatile reality of political life in which a PSB and its agent operate may yet 
offer other additional explanations that may have to be considered. These contextual 
explanatory factors are factors beyond the institutional sphere of the PSB itself.  These will be 
included in the study insofar they provide plausible alternative explanations for an apparent 
display of result oriented allocation. Two notable ones stand out but are by no means limitative. 
 Macro economic factors may influence the allocation of resources. The occurrence of 
financial crises can be powerful drivers of policy changes affecting the principal-agent 
relationship. The pressure from these factors may lead principal and agent to 
(temporarily) behave according to PBB expectations of result oriented allocation. 
 Shifting political preferences can also be an explanatory factor. The dominant policy 
paradigm can shift because of changed political preferences resulting in a change in 
political leadership. If this occurs suddenly, a changed policy direction may be marketed 
as lessons learned from performance measurement or evaluation. 
 
In Figure 2, the theoretical model of this research as explained above is shown graphically. 
 
 
Figure 2 Theoretical model of PBB functioning according to logic of consequence and 
alternative explanations  
 
 
10. Refining the model with indicators 
Because this study attempts to determine the actual contribution of PBB methods on apparent 
PBB success, cases are sought that could qualify as successful cases of PBB implementation. 
These cases ought to share a number of common characteristics, among which obviously  the 
ability to qualify as a potential PBB success in terms of technical efficiency. 
 
1. It involves a national policy goal and performance targets tied to the national budget 
2. Policy execution takes place in principal-agent setting (preferably a National HQ and 
regional agents) with the (plausible) presence of the associated problems of:  
 conflicting goals and  
 superior access to information on the part of the agent 
3. The program and its execution are regarded a PBB success  
4. There is de facto performance steering on the part of the principal  
 PBB is used by the PSB’s principal to control the PSB  
5. There is de facto performance management on the part of  the agent  
 PBB is used in addition to traditional budget preparation  
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Table 2  Testing model with theoretical concepts and indicators  
 
 
If qualified cases are identified, the degree to which it is truly a textbook NMP/PBB success is to 
be measured as well as the potential presence of the selected alternative explanations for this 
success. In table 2 an approach for testing cases is presented. Obviously qualitative testing of a 
limited number of cases for plausible alternative explanations cannot provide the final word 
over PBB effectiveness. The presence or absence of alternative neo-institutional explanations 
for perceived success may however give an additional indication on the potential of this NPM 
tool to change behaviour in public organizations. 
 
Epilogue 
In this article it was argued that the classical notion that institutions matter to political 
outcomes and the conviction that political behavior can be explained by observed behavior 
rather than expressed preferences gave way to the rise of neo institutionalism. Depending on 
the neo-institutional branch, behavior of actors can be explained either by following rules about 
what is felt to be appropriate (historical/ sociological) or by calculation to maximize self interest 
(rational choice). The rational choice branch of neo-institutionalism highlighted the problem 
that a principal lacks adequate information to control its agent.  The wave of New Public 
Management in the 1980s and 1990s reshaped governance relationships in governments 
worldwide. PBB was promoted as one of the tools of choice for implementing the NPM agenda.  
 
Firstly this resulted in adopting public sector management methods and buzzwords like explicit 
performance standards, management by results, value for money etcetera. Second was an 
attempt to introduce incentive structures into public service. This meant disaggregating existing 
bureaucracies and contracting out to quasi markets (Rhodes 1997). Performance reporting was 
presented as part of the solution for the principal-agent dilemma and has been advocated 
worldwide since the era of New Public Management. As previously mentioned, the results of 
performance based budgeting (PBB), including this key element, has far from met all 
expectations. PBB theory itself has been accused of neglecting some important institutional 
variables when designed and implemented. 
 
 It may therefore be worthwhile to turn to the other two branches of new institutionalism 
(historical and sociological) when looking for explanations for the success record of PBB. These 
alternative explanations based on the logic of appropriateness may or may not provide plausible 
explanations why result oriented allocation occurred in selected cases. This may support or 
disregard the notion that PBB adoption is a plausible decisive factor contributing to result 
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oriented allocation. In order to be able to test these cases, the relevant neo institutional factor 
of the model introduced will have to be refined so it can be applied to the cases that report 
success of PPB in agency management.  
 
 
   
The approach and method presented offers, once refined, an adequate method to assess 
the research question 
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Figure 1  Linking of Theoretical concepts   
* IMPIU = Interactive Model of Performance Information Use 
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Figure 2  Theoretical model of PBB functioning according to logic of consequence and 
alternative explanations 
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Table 1  The utilization of performance information for technical efficiency 
 
Using P.I. for the activities:  With the purpose of :  Can result in: 
- Performance reporting for  
  external accountability 
- Setting program priorities 
- Strategically reallocate  
  internal resources 
- Understand the impact of   
  external events on PSB    
  performance goals 
Enlightment  
 
Support for major policy 
shifts or innovations 
 
- Deciding on outsourcing decisions 
- Developing and managing contracts  
- Monitor cost and performance and  
  contract management 
- Allocate funds to third parties 
Enlightment  
Program learning 
Managing principal-agent 
relationships better. 
- Coordinating program efforts with  
  other internal or external organizations 
- Analyzing productivity and funding levels  
- Allocating internal funds 
- Identifying service problems and  
  changing work processes 
- Adopting new program approaches  
  following evaluation 
Program learning Increased learning 
capacity within PSB 
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Table 2 Testing model with theoretical concepts and indicators 
 
Theoretical concepts Indicators (occurs when…is found) Absent Present 
to some 
extent 
Clearly 
present 
Agency Theory and Rational Choice Neo Institutionalism 
Successful PBB 
implementation in a 
PSB-Principal 
relationship 
PBB is used by the PSB in addition 
to traditional budgeting  
   
PBB is used by the PSB’s principal 
to control the PSB  
   
Textbook example of 
PBB implementation 
A high degree of de jure PBB 
implementation 
   
A high degree of de facto PBB 
implementation 
   
Favourable conditions from Historical neo institutionalism 
Path dependency  
 
A critical juncture after which PBB 
was felt as the solution to a broadly 
felt problem. 
   
Asymmetry of Power  An internal advocate or external 
champion of PBB in a powerful 
position.  
   
A policy field in which specialists 
are dominant, relative to the other 
political actors. 
   
Favorable conditions from Sociological Neo Institutionalism 
Cultural 
appropriateness 
A beneficial culture for 
organizational learning. This is 
characterized by a high degree of 
reflective and participative 
openness with regard to self 
reflection in discussing results. 
   
Cognitive frames A positive attitude towards a 
formalized performance 
measurement system. This is 
expressed by the fit between the 
official performance measures and 
one’s own measure for doing a job 
successfully. 
   
Favourable conditions beyond neo institutional factors 
Contextual explanatory 
variables 
Macro economic factors  
Shifting political preferences  
Others  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 New Public Management generally refers to a set of reforms that intend to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector by introducing different sorts of market style incentives. These include 
(Kraan 2010: 5):  
 Separation of policy execution from policy development,  
 Stimulating competition among service providers,  
 Loosening of standards of operational management,  
 Budgeting on the basis of output targets (performance budgeting) 
 Financing agencies on the basis of output targets 
 Outsourcing to the market. 
  
ii There are several ways of categorizing performance budgeting systems. A common way is to do so 
according to the degree to which performance information is linked to funding . Allen Schick distinguishes 
between two polar versions of performance budgeting, a broad and a strict definition (Schick 2003: 101): 
 
Broadly defined, a performance budget is any budget that presents information on what agencies have 
done or expect to do with the money provided to them. Strictly defined, a performance budget is only a 
budget that explicitly links each increment in resources to an increment in outputs or other results. The 
broad concept views budgeting in presentational terms, the strict version views it in terms of allocations. 
Many governments satisfy the broad definition, few satisfy the strict definition. 
 
Teresa Curristine uses a threefold typology of performance budgets in OECD countries (Curristine 2007). In 
some cases a direct link between performance, resource allocation and accountability is in place 
(direct/formula performance budgeting). More often the link is indirect and planned performance targets 
and results are used for planning and accountability purposes only (performance informed budgeting). 
Finally there are performance budgeting systems that have no link between performance and funding and 
use performance information for accountability only (presentational performance budgeting). In the NL, as 
in most OECD nations with a longstanding PBB record, all three forms are present in the budget bills.  
 
 
iii
 This NPM-ideal type agency model is considered to be a model based on performance contracting 
between a principal (often Ministry) and a public agent (often public Sector Bureau). The principal is 
exercises performance control and used performance evaluation for budgetary purposes while the agent is 
managed in a performance driven manner. 
 
iv
 Adverse selection refers to a situation where the principal is presented incorrect or incomplete 
information by the agent. Given his inability to verify this information the principal may base his decisions 
on inadequate information. An example is an employer who relies on incorrect résumés presented by 
jobseekers. 
 
 
v
 Moral hazard refers to a situation where the agent, who has a better awareness of risks and 
consequences, takes inappropriate risks in the knowledge that the principal will pay for their 
consequences. An example is a painter who is paid by the hour for a job and therefore decides to take it 
slowly. 
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vi
 Senge identifies two types of openness that are required for a beneficial culture for organizational 
learning (Senge 1990: 276-286):  
Participative openness:  Important issues are being discussed openly and fairly  
Reflective openness: The ability to continually challenge one’s own thinking 
 
vii
 The ‘misassumptions’ of PBB according to Beryl Radin (Radin 2006): 
 Information is already available 
 Information is neutral 
 We know what we are measuring 
 We can define cause-effect relationships in programs 
 Baseline information is available 
 Almost all activities can be measured and quantified 
  
viii
 For example: departments of education show international similarities and companies producing similar 
products have similarities because of diffusion of techniques and similarities in training. 
 
 
 
